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Introduction 
 
In Section 9 of the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant raises a problem that he says is “the key to 
the critique of taste,” namely: “whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure 
precedes the judging of the object or the latter precedes the former” (CJ 5:216). His answer is 
that judging precedes feeling. What is less clear is why this is the case, as well as how this 
conclusion fits into the overall argument of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and thus 
serves as its key. The task I take up in this chapter is to explain the relation between judging 
and feeling that makes distinctively aesthetic judgments possible. In order to establish the 
persuasiveness of Kant’s position it will be necessary to critically assess as well as develop 
his account. 
The reason the priority of judging is so crucial for the project of the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment is that, were it the case that the feeling of pleasure preceded judging, 
judgments of taste would express only the agreeableness of an object and would not qualify 
as subjectively universal. The judgment of taste is distinctively aesthetic because “mere 
judging” – his more precise title for “judging” and which Kant also refers to as the “free 
play” of the faculties, as we will see – is prior to our feeling of pleasure in an object. Thus, 
the rationale for the first part of the third Critique – the introduction of distinctively aesthetic 
judgments into the critical system – rests or falls on finding the answer to the problem posed 
in Section 9. 
The broader picture is not, however, to simply demote feeling with respect to judging, 
but to establish the distinctive type of aesthetic feeling on which aesthetic judgments are 
based. In the earlier sections of the Second Moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant has 
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argued that aesthetic feeling is subjectively universal (CJ 5:211-16). In Section 9 he 
establishes the distinguishing criterion for – and the condition for the subjective universality 
of – aesthetic feeling, namely, that it has as its ground mere judging. Establishing the precise 
nature of the relation between feeling and judging is required if the “key” is to unlock the 
overall argument of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. 
The feeling operative in an aesthetic judgment is distinctive from other “relations” to 
the feeling of pleasure and displeasure – such as the agreeableness of gratification and esteem 
as moral liking (CJ 5:209-10). This reveals that for Kant there are other kinds of feeling in 
addition to the aesthetic feeling that arises in response to a beautiful object. Throughout this 
chapter, however, when I refer to feeling I intend only the distinctively aesthetic feeling that 
is dually directed both to the object and to the activity of judging. I explain this dual-
directedness of feeling at the end of section two. 
Having mere judging as its ground qualifies feeling as the ground for judgments of 
taste. There is a double determination of judgments of taste, the direct ground of which is 
feeling, while their indirect ground is, by extension, mere judging. I will establish the 
distinction between judging and judgment entailed by this formula in section one. Although 
Kant does not provide an account of double determination in Section 9, I show how the 
beginnings of such an account are provided in the First Introduction in the second section of 
this chapter. 
I argue that in the Analytic of the Beautiful Kant introduces an account of feeling that 
operates as a non-cognitive and yet reflective form of awareness. The significance of this for 
Kant’s critical project cannot be underestimated. The range of modes of awareness – which 
hitherto comprised sensible intuitions, concepts of understanding and conceptually 
determining judgments, but also ideas and principles of reason – is extended to include a new 
distinctively aesthetic type of judgments that have feeling as their ground. This signals a 
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radical development in Kant’s project. Crucially, Kant views this development as the 
condition of the integrity of his critical system (CJ 5:196). Although I cannot address the 
question of the coherence of Kant’s system here, the emergence of reflective feeling, it would 
seem, is the key not only to the critique of taste but also to the coherence of the critical 
project as a whole. 
Establishing that feeling can be reflective has very wide-reaching ramifications, 
stretching well beyond Kant studies. I will briefly mention only two examples. First, Kant’s 
introduction of feeling has important implications for the relations between conceptually 
based cognition and pre-conceptual awareness. Feeling is usually considered as affective and 
as, at best, the object of reflection rather than as a variation on its form. Whether or not it is 
adequate to treat emotion as passive – as Kant typically does – he distinguishes feeling from 
emotion (CJ 5: 226). Feeling is a form of pathos that consequently turns out to operate not 
merely passively, but as a reflective form of consciousness. I show how the feeling of 
pleasure characteristic of taste qualifies as reflective insofar as it is a capacity both to 
differentiate and combine. I also argue that the intermediary status of feeling – between 
cognitive spontaneity and receptivity – allows it to operate as a reflection on the possibility of 
cognition without counting as an actual cognition. Kant’s account of feeling as reflective – if 
it works – puts in question the fork between, on the one hand, cognition where concepts go 
“all the way down” and, on the other, a pre-reflective experience that excludes 
conceptualization.
1
 
Another way in which reflective feeling has broader philosophical bite is, as I show, 
that it affords a self-reflection on mental activity – what Kant calls “the feeling of life” (CJ 
5:204). If this is right, aesthetic feeling offers an insight into the activity of consciousness. In 
particular, feeling shows up how the mind operates through a combination of both 
cooperative and distinctive orientations and that these orientations are intentionally directed. 
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1. The distinction between judging and judgment: A development of Kant’s “key” 
In this section I argue for a distinction between judging and judgment, which will allow for 
the solution of a series of problems, in particular, concerning the roles played in judgments of 
taste by feeling and objects, respectively. 
The key to the critique of taste – the priority of mere judging over feeling within 
judgments of taste – implies a distinction between judging and judgment. Kant makes the 
same distinction – still unexplained – in the Deduction of Taste (CJ 5:289). In my ensuing 
argument I will show how employing this distinction allows us to understand that the “key” 
can, indeed, explain how mere judging and feeling are related so as to make possible 
distinctively aesthetic judgments. It is necessary, however, to adapt and develop Kant’s 
statement of the “key.” In the first instance, I restate it as a two-term relation between judging 
and judgment, before going on to incorporate feeling in a three-term relation, at which point 
the continuity with Kant’s original formulation will be more apparent. 
First, the adaptation to the relation between judging and judgment: judging precedes 
judgment. Next, the development of the account so as to bring out the role played by the 
dependent term: judgment expresses judging. Taken together: while mere judging is the 
grounding condition for aesthetic judgments, in aesthetic judgments we exercise or express 
mere judging. The aesthetic judgment “This rose is beautiful” is a linguistic expression of my 
mere judging, that is, the free play of my mental powers in response to a particular flower. 
Although the linguistic status of judgments is underdeveloped throughout Kant’s opus, his 
account of taste in Sections 9 and 38 implies – and, I will argue, his overall argument requires 
– a distinction between having a mental state of free play and expressing this in a judgment. 
While he sometimes omits and never adequately accounts for this distinction, in section two I 
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will show that he requires it if his account is to avoid falling into a vicious circularity where 
mere judging grounds feeling and feeling grounds mere judging. 
The relation between judging and judgment is reciprocal but asymmetric – there is no 
judgment without mere judging as its ground, while judging is expressed in a judgment. It is 
important to distinguish between these two directions of implication, because the 
distinctively aesthetic judgment qualifies as such because it is ultimately referred to the 
activity of mere judging as the meaning of that judgment. If the direction of grounding were 
reversed, the distinctive character of aesthetic judgments as subjectively universal would be 
critically compromised. Moreover, the distinction Kant requires can be defended, for to say 
that a judgment expresses or exercises mere judging is not equivalent to saying that 
judgments ground judging. 
In the critical literature, there are a variety of ways of parsing the relation between 
judging and judgment. Two important – and highly contrastive – readings are proposed by 
Paul Guyer and Hannah Ginsborg. Guyer argues that reflective judgment comprises two acts: 
the first is an aesthetic estimate based on a harmony of the faculties, while the second is the 
aesthetic judgment proper which establishes the universal validity permitting the judgment 
that the object is beautiful.
2
 Hannah Ginsborg argues to the contrary that the activity of free 
play is itself the judgment of taste, which already makes a claim for universal validity. There 
is thus no need for “two conceptually distinct acts of reflective judgment.”
3
 I agree with 
Guyer that it is necessary to make a distinction between a judgment proper and the harmony 
of the faculties, which is another cognate term for mere judging. I do not, however, agree that 
there are two discrete acts of reflective judgment, but hold, rather, that judging activity is 
expressed in an aesthetic judgment. The content communicated by an aesthetic judgment is, 
in my view, nothing other than mere judging – standing in some relation, yet to be 
established, to feeling – insofar as it is prompted by something beautiful. Thus, while I insist 
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against Ginsborg that Kant’s account implies two levels, I agree with her – against Guyer – 
that subjective universality arises at the level of mere judging. My solution is that mere 
judging is the ground of judgments of taste insofar as mere judging establishes the 
universality condition for judgments. 
Before moving on to a further development of the “key” in line with the distinction I 
have proposed, I should clarify the range of terms used for – as well as the meaning of – 
“mere judging.” In Section 9, the judging element within judgments of taste is referred to in a 
number of ways, which in this chapter will be treated as equivalent in their denotation – even 
if they may not be identical in their connotation. The judging that is prior in a judgment of 
taste is also called “merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object [bloß subjective 
[ästhetische] Beurteilung des Gegenstandes]” (CJ 5:218), while in the First Introduction it is 
referred to as “mere reflection on a perception [bloße Reflexion]” (FI 20:220). “Mere 
judging” is additionally referred to as a “mental state [Gemütszustand] that is encountered in 
the relation of the powers of presentation [Vorstellungskräfte]” (CJ 5:217, translation 
modified),
4
 as a “free play” of the cognitive or presentational powers (CJ 5:217), and as a 
“harmony of the faculties of cognition” (CJ 5:218). Provisionally, the meaning of all these 
terms is the activity of the subjective capacities necessary for what can variously be described 
as cognition, presentation, or determining judgment, but only where their exercise in a 
reflective judgment gives rise to no determination of an object or its constituent intuition (CJ 
5:217). I return to the ultimate ground of mere judging in the subjective conditions of 
cognition in my final section. As mere judging is what establishes the judgment of taste as 
reflective, I will sometimes refer to it simply as “reflection.” 
At this point – in order to address the problem of the role played by feeling in 
judgments of taste – it is necessary to develop the “key” into a three-term relation, 
comprising mere judging, feeling, and judgment. In short, feeling operates as the 
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intermediary term between judging and judgment. The solution I will implement in section 
two is the following: mere judging grounds feeling that, in turn, grounds aesthetic judgments. 
Meanwhile, aesthetic judgments express feeling that, in turn, expresses mere judging. The 
two levels of expression are distinctive in that feeling is consciousness of mere judging, while 
a judgment is an expression or exercise of the feeling of mere judging. Nonetheless, both 
expressive relations are dependent on and thus contrasted to their corresponding grounds. 
The final (principal) problem I address in this chapter is the contribution of the object 
to aesthetic reflection. The formulation of the question in the title of Section 9 makes clear 
that both judging and pleasure are directed to an object. I am not concerned in this chapter 
with whether there are aspects of objects that make them apt for aesthetic reflection.
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However, I cannot exclude from the current discussion the way in which the presentation of 
an object initiates reflection. Mere judging is “set into play” through a given presentation 
(Die Erkenntniskräfte, die durch diese Vorstellung ins Spiel gesetzt werden …) (CJ 5:217). 
Moreover, Kant claims that the enlivening of the mental powers arises through the 
“prompting” of the given presentation (vermittelst des Anlasses der gegebenen Vorstellung) 
(CJ 5:219, translation modified). Both claims strongly imply that the object contributes to 
aesthetic reflection. At the end of the next section I argue that when I make the judgment that 
something is beautiful I do so because my feeling about it has mere judging as its ground. 
 
 
2. Free play as a feeling of the life of the mind 
So far we have seen that – in some sense still to be identified – mere judging precedes 
feeling. Nonetheless, feeling plays a crucial role as our consciousness of the free play of the 
faculties (CJ 5:219). Moreover, Kant claims that the mental state is a feeling: “Thus the 
mental state in this presentation must be that of a feeling of the free play of the powers of 
presentation” (CJ 5:217, translation modified). In what follows I will make sense of these 
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seemingly incompatible claims by showing how in free play the mind is implicitly self-
conscious of its own activity and that such a mental state cannot be separate from 
consciousness of it. 
In this section I argue that the “feeling of life” mentioned by Kant in Section 1 of the 
Critique of Aesthetic Judgment refers to the free play of the faculties, which is the centerpiece 
of his discussion in Section 9 (CJ 5:204). This helps explain why free play and feeling may 
not be distinct. However, Kant claims that the feeling of life is the basis for judgments of 
taste, and this leads to the apparent contradiction that both mental state and feeling qualify as 
determining. Building on the distinction I made between judgment and judging in the 
previous section, I argue that this problem can be resolved with the help of the First 
Introduction’s account of what I call a double determination of judgments of taste both by 
mental state (or mere judging) and by feeling. I next argue that the determination of feeling 
by the mental state operates through reasons, not causes. Further building on the extended 
version of the “key” outlined in section one, I argue that the same mental state qualifies as 
mere judging when it is seen as ground and as feeling insofar as it affords consciousness of – 
or expresses – that ground. Finally, I explain why a self-reflective feeling of our mental state 
is only graspable through the pleasure we take in the presentation of a beautiful object. 
How are we to account for Kant’s claim in Section 9 that the mental state “must be” a 
feeling of free play (CJ 5:217)? If feeling provides consciousness of the mental state, then 
why would he claim that the latter is a feeling? This is either incoherent or, as I will argue, 
puts in question the view that mental state and feeling are distinct. I propose that we can 
make sense of this apparently aberrant claim by linking the argument of Section 9 to the idea 
of the “feeling of life [Lebensgefühl]” introduced in Section 1 of the Analytic of the Beautiful 
(CJ 5:204).
6
 As I read it, the feeling of life is a feeling of the liveliness of the mind, which in 
Section 9 is referred to as “the enlivened relation between the two faculties [die Belebung 
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beider Vermögen]” and which is nothing other than the free play of the faculties (CJ 5:219, 
translation modified). We experience the life of the mind as a feeling of pleasure: “Here the 
presentation is related entirely to the subject, indeed to its feeling of life, under the name of 
the feeling of pleasure or displeasure” (CJ 5:204, translation modified). I conclude that the 
free play of the faculties – as a feeling of life – is a feeling of pleasure. 
A problem arises, however, in what might be called the genealogy of judgments of 
taste. In Section 1 Kant announces that judgments of taste are distinctive in that they have 
feeling as their ground: the “feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure … grounds [gründet] an entirely special faculty for discriminating and judging” 
(CJ 5:204). This claim appears to lead to two problems. First, it may sound as if feeling is the 
ground of judging and not the reverse, as is argued in Section 9. Even if this could be 
resolved, a further problem arises as to how both feeling and mere judging can be 
determining, for this sounds like a viciously circular claim. This second problem would be 
dissolved if it could be established that the mental state and feeling are determining in 
different respects. 
The first problem could be resolved in the following way: when Kant says that feeling 
is the basis of the capacity for judging (Beurteilungsvermögen), the latter refers to the 
capacity for making judgments not for the mere judging exercised in such judgments. 
Beurteilung is the term Kant uses for mere judging, but he always does so with a qualifier 
such as “merely [bloß].” Moreover, Beurteilung, like “judging,” can be understood as the 
activity of making judgments, and Kant often uses the term as simply equivalent to Urteil, 
that is, judgment. Consistently, Beurteilungsvermögen is used to explain “taste 
[Geschmack],” which I understand as the power to make aesthetic judgments (CJ 5:203n, 
211, 240, 295). The proposed solution is, however, tested by Kant immediately going on to 
say that the power in question “merely compares,” and this, I will show in section three, is a 
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further cognate expression for mere reflection. This transition in Section 1 thus tends to 
support Ginsborg’s claim that there is no distinction between judgment and judging. However 
– apart from the fact that this seems to undersell the expressive aspect of judgments – the 
distinction is necessary if Kant is not to fall into the vicious circularity of claiming in Section 
1 that feeling is the ground of mere judging and in Section 9 that mere judging is the ground 
of feeling. The distinction of levels he introduces in Sections 9 and 38 is required in Section 1 
even though it is omitted. 
I will now examine a distinction that makes the suggested solutions to both problems 
compelling. In the First Introduction Kant distinguishes two types of precedence operative in 
respect of aesthetic judgments of reflection and which correspond to the distinction of levels 
between judging and judgment that, I am arguing, his account requires: 
the harmonious play of the two faculties of cognition … produces [bewirkt] through 
this mere form a sensation that is the determining ground [Bestimmungsgrund] of a 
judgment which for that reason is called aesthetic and as subjective purposiveness 
(without a concept) is combined with the feeling of pleasure. (FI 20:224) 
In this passage Kant claims both that mere judging produces – or brings about – sensation 
(Empfindung) and that sensation determines a judgment (ein Urteil). Despite the causal-
sounding terminology of the first claim, I will argue that both claims refer to grounds or 
reasons not causes. 
However, it is first necessary to establish the identity of the “sensation” that 
determines judgments. We have already seen that feeling plays this role in Section 1. 
Meanwhile, in Section 9 Kant, strictly speaking, says that we can only become conscious of 
free play through sensation (Empfindung) (CJ: 219). It is not remotely likely Kant is 
suggesting that we become aware of our mental state through the type of sensation that in the 
Critique of Pure Reason was defined as “the effect of an object on the capacity for 
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presentation” (A19-20/B34, translation modified). Immediately prior to the passage just 
quoted from the First Introduction, Kant provides the premise suppressed in Section 9 with 
the following definition of feeling: there is “only one so-called sensation that can never 
become a concept of an object, and this is the feeling of pleasure and displeasure” (FI 
20:224). This sensation uniquely qualifies as a feeling in that it is not determinable under a 
concept, unlike the usual sort of sensation. This is why, earlier, I reported Kant as claiming in 
Section 9 that feeling affords consciousness of mere judging. Feeling is a unique sensation. 
Seen in this light, the First Introduction’s account reveals the following double 
determination: first, the harmony of the faculties (or mere judging) produces or brings about 
– or, as Kant puts it in Section 9, “precedes” – the sensation (the feeling of pleasure), and, 
second, as Kant also says in Section 1, feeling is the determining ground of judgments of 
taste. The First Introduction’s formulation does not entail that feeling is the ground of mere 
judging and only that it determines judgments of taste, or as he puts it in Section 1, our 
capacity for such judgments.
7
 In Section 9 Kant adds a further layer to his account: “the 
judgment of taste … determines the object, independently of concepts, with regard to liking 
and the predicate of beauty” (CJ 5:219, translation modified). Taking up the distinction 
between grounding and expressing I introduced in the previous section, the feeling of 
pleasure and displeasure is determining of the judgment, which expresses our feeling that the 
object is beautiful. As a consequence of its determination by feeling, the aesthetic judgment 
non-cognitively determines the object to be beautiful. Thus, there is no vicious circularity, for 
while mere judging determines feeling, feeling determines aesthetic judgments. This means 
that there is a double determination of aesthetic judgments, which, in turn, determine the 
object. The unique so-called sensation or feeling thus has the peculiar status of being both 
undeterminable and the indirect ground for a non-conceptual determination. 
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So far I have argued that the feeling of life is the pleasurable awareness of mental 
activity in the particular guise of the enlivened activity of the faculties. Consequently, mere 
judging and feeling are not distinct mental events, though I will argue that they are 
distinguishable aspects of the same mental event. In order to show that the account I have 
given so far is viable, I now need to explain how it is consistent with the priority of mere 
judging with respect to feeling. 
 In what sense, then, does free play “precede,” “determine,” “ground,” “produce,” or 
“bring about” the sensation or feeling within the same mental event? Is the precedence that of 
cause to effect? Guyer reads the relation between the harmony of the faculties and the feeling 
of pleasure as causal.
8
 Henry Allison, meanwhile, insists that the feeling of pleasure is 
intentionally directed to free play.
9
 For Allison, at least in Kant’s Theory of Taste, the 
intentional status of feeling is compatible with its being caused by mere judging.
10
 In his 
earlier, more extended discussion of this issue, Allison insists that the feeling of pleasure is 
intentionally and not causally linked to the harmony of the faculties.
11
 My view is that the 
precedence of mere judging cannot be causal in any sense. For Kant, a causal relation 
requires determination under a concept (A189/B234). As the unique so-called sensation 
cannot be determined under a concept, it cannot be caused by the mental state of free play or 
by anything else. Moreover, a causal relation would require the distinctiveness of cause and 
effect, and if the mental state is a feeling, then they are not distinct. The peculiarity of the 
intentional relation between mere judging and our consciousness of it through feeling is that 
it operates as a form of self-reflection in which the constituent terms cannot be distinct, 
although they are distinguishable. I propose that mere judging rationally grounds rather than 
causes feeling despite Kant’s causal-sounding term bewirken.12 Correlatively, feeling grounds 
rather than causes judgments. Kant explicitly uses “determining ground 
[Bestimmungsgrund]” and “grounds [gründet]” for the second level of determination (FI 
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20:224; CJ 5:204), and his account entails that, although feeling is distinguishable from 
judgment, they are not distinct, as would be required for a causal relation. Thus Kant asks 
how we become conscious in a judgment of taste of mere judging (CJ: 218). 
The solution I am arguing for is that mere judging precedes feeling insofar as the 
former is the reason for – not the cause of – the latter. The free play of the faculties explains 
why a distinctively aesthetic feeling of pleasure is subjectively universal. Free play secures 
subjective universality because it is a particularly harmonious exhibition of the coordination 
of the subjective faculties necessary for any cognition (CJ 5:218). Feeling, meanwhile, is the 
respect in which the play of the faculties expresses, that is, qualifies as consciousness of – not 
just the fact that there is – mental activity. It is thus not that first there is a harmonious 
relation between the faculties and subsequently a pleasure, but rather that the distinctively 
aesthetic pleasure arises as one in the harmony of the faculties. The same mental state can be 
regarded both as ground insofar as it exhibits the relation between the subjective faculties of 
cognition necessary for any judgment and also as consciousness of that mental state in a 
feeling of pleasure.
13
 This dual status is characteristic of a mental state in which the mind is 
conscious through feeling of its own mental activity: in aesthetic judgments of reflection “the 
mind becomes conscious in the feeling of its state” (CJ 5:204). 
We now can understand how Kant can claim both that the mental state is a feeling of 
free play and that the mental state is the ground for the feeling of pleasure in that free play 
(CJ 5:218). Not only would we have no access to the mental state of free play if we had no 
consciousness of it through feeling; there is free play of the faculties only insofar as we are 
conscious through feeling of that playful relation. The distinctively aesthetic feeling of 
pleasure is the life of the mind in its free play. When we consider the mental state in respect 
of its subjective universality we see it as mere judging, but when we consider the same 
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mental state as a form of consciousness we see it as feeling. The same mental state qualifies 
as ground in the first case and as an expression of that ground in the second. 
The reciprocal implications of mere judging and feeling are not viciously circular 
because I have distinguished the grounding term – mere judging – from the expressing term – 
feeling. The difficulty, rather, is how we get hold of – and hold onto – a reflection on our 
own reflective activity. This is where our contemplation of a beautiful object plays a 
necessary role in aesthetic reflection. As I mentioned in the previous section, the presentation 
of a beautiful object sets the faculties in play or prompts them into an enlivened and 
accordant (einhellig) relation (CJ 5:217, 219). When the object prompts or sets off free play, 
the former is neither the cause nor the occasion of the latter. It cannot be the case that the 
object causes mere judging, for free play could not be caused and remain free. If the object, 
on the other hand, simply occasioned reflection, this would result in a merely random 
correlation between object and mental state, not a determination through feeling. As a result, 
anything could and nothing would necessarily count as beautiful. This is not Kant’s position, 
as I have argued elsewhere.
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If the object neither causes nor merely occasions mere judging, then what does it 
mean to say that it “prompts” free play? Although it is contingent whether we find something 
beautiful, once we do so the ground for our liking of the object is that it gives rise to a free 
play of our faculties.
15
 This non-causal reading allows for an asymmetric but reciprocal 
relation between mental state and object. While free play supplies the motivation for our 
finding something beautiful, it is only through the beautiful object that we get purchase on 
free play. It will be apparent that I am offering the same structural account of pleasure 
whether it refers to free play or in response to the object. This is because the pleasure we take 
in the object is aesthetic only insofar as we take pleasure in the object’s prompting a free play 
of the faculties. 
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Mere judging not only precedes the feeling of pleasure in the object, but also is the 
basis (Grund) of a pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive powers (CJ 5:218). My solution 
is that pleasure in the object is at the same time pleasure in mere judging.
16
 This approach 
allows us to make sense of a fine – and, I believe, significant – detail of Kant’s account, 
namely, that when he first introduces the pleasure we take in the play of the faculties, he 
refers to it as “this pleasure [dieser Lust],” which suggests that it has just been discussed (CJ 
5:218, emphasis added). Immediately beforehand, the discussion is, however, of pleasure in 
the object. Through the use of the demonstrative article, Kant shows that the two pleasures 
are one and the same, in the one case viewed in its intentional directedness toward the object, 
while in the other in its intentional directedness toward our mental activity in response to that 
object. There is, thus, a dual intentional directedness of one and the same pleasure, rather 
than two pleasures. An advantage of my account – in addition to making sense of the letter of 
Kant’s text – is that it avoids the difficulty that, were there two pleasures, it would be 
necessary to explain how they are connected. This difficulty falls away once they are 
recognized as two aspects of one and the same pleasure. 
 
 
3. Feeling as a power to reflect 
In the previous section I argued that mere judging and feeling are two ways of describing the 
same mental event. We have also seen that feeling is the basis for aesthetic reflective 
judgments. The question arises: how can feeling qualify as judging such that it provides the 
basis for judgments of taste? A feeling, we might think, belongs to the affective side of 
experience, with the consequence that it could only contribute to the content of judgment. In 
this section I argue that feeling qualifies as mere judging insofar as it is reflective. The 
relevant type of reflection only arises as consciousness of that reflection and thus must be 
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expressed in feeling, the condition of that consciousness. I first establish that the reflection in 
question is a capacity for comparison and then show how feeling is reflective insofar as it 
compares the presentational capacities of imagination and understanding. These faculties are 
compared both with regard to what they have in common and their difference. Both faculties 
contribute to presentation, but they carry out different roles: imagination combines, while 
understanding unifies. 
Kant defines reflection as the ability to compare and hold together: “To reflect 
[Reflektieren] (to consider [Überlegen]) … is to compare and to hold together [vergleichen 
und zusammen zu halten] given presentations either with others or with one’s faculty of 
cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible” (FI 20:211, translation modified). 
The first option covers the logical reflection operative in the genesis of empirical concepts 
(JL 9:92; VL 24:905). Meanwhile, the second captures the transcendental reflection of the 
Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection in the first Critique (A260-92/B316-49). Both these 
uses of reflection are preparatory for determining judgment: logical reflection generates 
empirical concepts under which the sensible manifold can be determined, while 
transcendental reflection establishes a distinction between the faculties necessary prior to the 
determination of the presentation of an object (A269/B325). Neither of these types of 
reflection, however, is sufficient for judgment, whether reflective or determining. There is, 
however, another use of reflection that, like transcendental reflection, compares a 
presentation with our cognitive powers and yet qualifies as judgment. Judgment can be 
regarded either as “a mere faculty for reflecting” or as an ability to determine (CJ 20:211). I 
take this to mean that reflective judgment is the ability to make judgments that express mere 
reflection. Mere reflection arises when the activity of reflection is carried out for its own sake 
and is not directed to determining a presentation of an object under a concept. As I argued in 
section two, such reflection is inseparable from our consciousness of it. In reflective 
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judgments of taste, reflection and feeling converge, because the reflection that such 
judgments have as their ground is not merely a condition of cognition but also constitutes an 
alternative, non-cognitive form of awareness. 
In aesthetic judgments – the ground of which is feeling – mere judging “only 
compares the given presentation in the subject to the entire faculty of presentation” (CJ 
5:204, translation modified). Thus feeling is the basis for judgments that express the 
reflective comparison of the presentation of an object with our mental activity in determining 
an object as beautiful. As I argued in the last section, the play of the faculties is the ground of 
the feeling in the sense that mere judging establishes the subjective universal validity of this 
feeling. If feeling is the consciousness of free play and the mental state of free play is a 
feeling, then we can conclude that feeling is a conscious – although implicit – reflection that 
compares the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding in their free play. 
Feeling as reflective is the capacity to non-cognitively discriminate – that is, 
differentiate – so as to make possible judgments as expressions of that mere judging (CJ 
5:204). This implies that mere judging – as well as the judgments expressing it – is 
necessarily bound up with differentiation. Although Kant does not explicitly develop the idea 
of discrimination, he does not simply abandon it, as I will show. The link between 
comparison and differentiation is evident in Kant’s Lectures on Logic. In the Jäsche Logic, 
comparison establishes difference: “I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first 
comparing [vergleichen17] these objects with one another I note that they are different 
[verschieden] from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.” 
Reflection (Reflexion, Überlegung), meanwhile, establishes “that which they have in 
common [gemein] among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves” (JL 9:94-95). 
Reflection and comparison are distinguished in this discussion, although Allison and Béatrice 
Longuenesse are certainly right that they must be integrated in their use.
18
 In fact, Kant uses 
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the two terms interchangeably. The Blomberg Logic states that in logical abstraction we 
compare concepts in light of what they have in common (BL 24:255).
19
 In the Blomberg 
Logic and the Vienna Logic, comparison is directed both to what differentiates and to what is 
held in common (BL 24:274; VL 24:833-34). Finally, in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of 
Reflection, transcendental reflection differentiates the faculties of sensibility and 
understanding in light of the concepts that fall under them. This counts as a form of 
comparison: “all judgments, indeed all comparisons [Vergleichungen], require a reflection 
[Überlegung20], i.e., a distinction [Unterscheidung] of the cognitive power to which the given 
concepts belong” (A261/B317). Comparison and reflection are clearly mutually dependent, 
and either term can refer to difference or to what is held in common. In what follows, I will 
show how the mere reflection characteristic of aesthetic judgments and of which we are 
conscious through feeling is oriented both to difference and commonality. 
Through feeling we are able to reflect on the presentational powers relating to one 
another. My proposal is that this reflection is a comparison. In feeling a free play of the 
faculties, we are aware both of their commonality and their difference. Their commonality 
arises only insofar as we are also aware of the difference between the respective roles they 
play. There would be no playful relation were both faculties occupying exactly the same 
roles; there would be no harmony were both faculties singing the same notes. One way of 
highlighting their contrasting roles is through a consideration of the respective relations in 
which the two faculties stand to freedom in free play. Mere reflection is directed to the 
reciprocal relation between the faculties, but only imagination is predisposed to freedom from 
determination under laws (CJ 5:40-41).
21
 While Kant refers not only to “the free lawfulness 
of the imagination” but also to “the free lawfulness of the understanding,” we might say that 
in an aesthetic judgment the understanding is forced to be free (CJ 5:240-41). 
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The respective roles of the faculties in the relation of free play can be seen more 
clearly with the help of the Transcendental Deduction from the first edition of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. Imagination’s role within mere judging is the “combining [Zusammensetzung] 
of the manifold in intuition” without a determining concept (CJ 5:217, translation modified). 
In the first Critique’s Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination, combination 
(Verbindung) is the activity of the pure transcendental synthesis of imagination and is a 
necessary but insufficient condition of cognition (A101). Meanwhile, the understanding’s 
role that is compared to imagination within mere judging would be to provide “the unity 
[Einheit] of the concept” (CJ 5:217). This corresponds to the first Critique’s Synthesis of 
Recognition in the Concept, where the role of the understanding is to establish the unity 
(Einheit) of an object under a concept, without which the manifold would not constitute a 
whole (A103). Thus to unify an object is to determine it by unifying its manifold under a 
concept. In the play of the faculties mere judging compares the activity of combining without 
a concept with the activity of unification under a concept. Aesthetic reflective comparison 
shows up the difference as well as the commonality of these ways of holding together the 
manifold in intuition. This comparison establishes the basis for aesthetic judgment – a mere 
judging that combines but does not unify and of which we are conscious as feeling. 
 
4. Exhibiting the life of the mind 
I have explained how in a judgment of taste feeling operates as a form of reflection that 
compares the faculties as to their difference as well as their commonality and thus is not 
aimed at unification. Still, it may seem that the harmony of the faculties models 
imagination’s combining of the manifold on the unifying function of understanding and, as a 
result, aesthetic judgments are oriented toward cognition even though they do not achieve 
it.
22
 In this section I will argue that the commonality of the faculties in free play is not that 
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they both aim at unification, but rather that they both aim at exhibition (Darstellung): while 
the exhibition of a concept of understanding necessarily entails unity, imagination gives rise 
to an alternative exhibition that does not. 
Kant uses “presentation [or representation, Vorstellung]” to refer to a range of types 
of awareness, including intuitions, concepts, and cognitions (see A140/B179-80, A320/B376-
77). Meanwhile, “exhibition [Darstellung]” – when used as a technical term in the third 
Critique – refers strictly to the combination of two presentations, namely, the combination of 
an intuition with a concept.
23
 Judgment is the faculty that carries out exhibition. Determining 
judgments exhibit a concept so as to give rise to cognition. In the First Introduction, judgment 
exhibits (Darstellung [exhibitio]) a concept of the understanding by finding for it a 
corresponding intuition (FI 20:220). Similarly, in the published Introduction Kant writes: “If 
the concept of an object is given, the work of judgment, in its use as exhibiting [Darstellung] 
(exhibitio) a cognition, is in placing beside a concept a corresponding intuition” (CJ 5:192, 
translation modified; see also RP 20:325-26).
24
 While Darstellung is not used as a technical 
term in the Schematism, we can conclude that when a concept is exhibited so as to give rise 
to cognition, the concept is schematized with an intuition (A138/B177).
25
 
It is not the case, however, that all exhibitions are cognitive. In the published 
Introduction, Kant affirms that exhibition also arises in aesthetic judgments: “we can regard 
natural beauty as the exhibition [Darstellung] of the concept of formal (merely subjective) 
purposiveness” (CJ 5:193, translation modified). The more tentative statement in the First 
Introduction is that in the harmony of the faculties imagination “agrees [übereinkommt] with 
the exhibition [Darstellung] of a concept of the understanding” (FI 20:220-21, translation 
modified). In his later discussion of hypotyposis, symbolic exhibition is a procedure carried 
out by the power of judgment (Urteilskraft) and is analogous with schematizing hypotyposis 
in terms of “merely the form of the reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the 
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concept” (CJ 5:351). My proposal is that an exhibition arises in our consciousness – the 
feeling – of merely judging the relation between the faculties in their purposiveness for one 
another. Judgments of taste express such an exhibition. 
If both cognitive judgments and mere judging exhibit a concept, what is the 
distinction between them? Aesthetic exhibition is of a concept, “which concept this is being 
indeterminate” (FI 20:221, translation modified). In a cognitive judgment it could not be 
indeterminate which concept was exhibited, for only through the determination of an intuition 
under a specific concept or concepts can knowledge arise. On the other hand, it is not clear 
that an aesthetic judgment can exhibit any concept. I think the solution is that aesthetic 
exhibition is not so much of a determining concept indeterminately grasped, but of a principle 
which, broadly speaking, could be described as an indeterminate concept. Read in this way, 
mere judging in aesthetic judgment exhibits the principle that all judgments require a 
cooperative relation between the faculties of sensibility and understanding as the ground of 
mere judging. Aesthetic exhibition thus does not exhibit a schematized relation between a 
concept and an intuition, but rather exhibits the relation between the faculties that makes the 
schematisation of intuitions and concepts possible. The published Introduction sums this up 
in saying that what is exhibited is the “concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness” 
(CJ 5:193; see also FI 20:224). Aesthetic exhibition is of the mutually purposive coordination 
of the faculties that is, in principle, required for finding a corresponding intuition for a 
concept, whether or not that combination is schematized. 
Aesthetic exhibition takes place in “the form of the reflection,” because it is mere 
reflection, or as I have argued, reflective feeling that exhibits the relation between the 
faculties (CJ 5:351). Thus the activity of imagination in its freedom within an aesthetic 
judgment is distinct from the exhibition of a concept of understanding both with regard to 
what is exhibited – an indeterminate concept or principle, rather than a determining concept – 
22 
 
 
and in how it exhibits – through feeling rather than through the determination of an intuition 
under a concept of understanding. While it is certainly the case that the exhibition brought 
about by a determining judgment entails unity, it is not the case that all exhibition aims at 
unification. An exhibition operating through feeling and aiming to exhibit the indeterminate 
principle of our mental activity is not apt for determinate unification or even for aiming at – 
and failing to achieve – unification. In the next section I will develop this argument further, 
showing how an exhibition carried out by feeling resists cognitive resolution. What can be 
concluded at this stage is that imagination harmonizes with the exhibition of a concept of 
understanding, for they have in common the coordination of the subjective faculties 
necessary for any judgment. Nonetheless, feeling carries out a distinctive form of exhibition 
not directed to unification of an intuition under a concept. 
I have argued that reflective feeling exhibits the subjective powers of cognition in 
their free play: both natural beauty and beautiful art affect us in such a way that the mind 
“feels its own state.” In particular, I argued in section two that the beautiful object allows us 
to hold onto conscious activity in its free play. Thus, although aesthetic exhibition is a form 
of self-consciousness, it is one that arises through our response to the presentation of a 
beautiful thing.
26
 We can draw a parallel with the Refutation of Idealism, where Kant says 
that “the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of 
actual things that I perceive outside myself” (B275-76). According to Kant, beautiful things 
set in play judging activity; that is, they prompt a response in judgments based on mere 
judging. In doing so, an artwork, for instance, offers a focus through which I can become 
aware of the activity of my mind. This is why Kant says that the aesthetic judgment – strictly 
speaking, mere judging – is referred to the subject and that “the subject feels itself” (CJ 
5:204). But, although taste is subjective, it is not introspective and is, rather, an awareness of 
how “it [the subject] is affected by the presentation” (CJ 5:204, translation modified). Such 
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self-awareness can only arise indirectly – as in a sidelong glance – when, for instance, I am 
absorbed by an artwork. My claim is not that artworks operate so as to make possible a 
peculiar epistemological analysis of consciousness, but that they afford an existential insight 
into conscious activity.
27
 Such insight will always operate at the limits of our experience, for 
it is an experience of the subjective conditions of that experience. For Kant, judging 
something to be beautiful involves a consciousness of the playful activity of my mental 
powers. Thus to make an aesthetic judgment is, for Kant, to be implicitly aware of the life of 
the mind.
 
An artwork prompts such implicit insight into the activity of consciousness when, for 
instance, it offers patterns that are not determinable under a unifying concept or within a 
conceptual scheme. When we respond to such emergent order it is possible to glimpse the 
activity of the mind responding in free play. Playfulness visible in the presentation of the 
artwork is apt for a playful response on the part of the mind.
28
 
I will now illustrate how an artwork can present an alternative order that initiates 
consciousness of mere judging. I will discuss briefly how the lighting effects of a particular 
painting display combination but not unity. Rembrandt’s The Night Watch is a figurative 
portrayal of a group of influential Amsterdam citizens (see illustration below). Some of these 
men paid a commission for their inclusion in the mass portrait and, no doubt, the painting 
captures real historical relations in other ways. However, the painting offers its own vision of 
reality. A principal way in which it does so is through its use of lighting effects. The Night 
Watch shows figures appearing into the light or receding from view. The painting is very 
dark, so it is even more striking that certain – although by no means all – figures in the 
foreground are highlighted by their luminescence. This is most obviously true of the 
lieutenant, the brightness of whose light-colored uniform is intensified by the contrastive 
shadow of the captain’s arm falling upon it. The girl to the left of the captain, the captain’s 
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face, his decorative ruff, and the drum to the right of the lieutenant are also illuminated, even 
though their positions make it improbable that they share the same light source. Nor does it 
seem plausible that the figures left only partially lit in the surrounding darkness owe their 
darkness solely to their spatial positions. Rather than unitary lighting – either natural or 
artificial – the painting deploys combinations and configurations of light and dark – typical of 
chiaroscuro – which construct a series of relations that emerge only on the canvas and do not 
offer a reproduction of a determinate external reality. 
 
[Insert illustration here.] 
Rembrandt van Rijn, Militia Company of District II under the Command of Captain Frans 
Banninck Cocq, commonly known as The Night Watch, 1642. Oil on canvas. Rijksmuseum, 
Amsterdam. 
 
When we contemplate this painting, that is, when we allow ourselves to become 
absorbed by it, we take up its combinations in our response to it. The painting’s lighting 
effects encourage – in a non-causal sense, they require – a response that is free or open. Yet it 
is not the case that there is no order in the painting, just that the order is not determined by a 
unified external reality. Correlatively, the mind is not chaotic and, rather, makes sense 
without requiring unified sense. If, on the contrary, we tried to unify what is strictly a 
combination, we would experience neither the painting nor free mental activity. 
Aesthetic judgments, such as those I have outlined about the lighting effects in 
Rembrandt’s The Night Watch, express feelings – not cognitions – about the painting. Such 
judgments make explicit implicit discriminations and connections I make in looking at the 
painting. I explore the painting reflectively without coming to a definitive conclusion. Such 
judgments are not directed to determining a quality in the painting, nor to establishing 
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something internal to my mind. I give myself over to the painting – I am taken up with it – 
and, in return, I receive an awareness of my own mental activity through my awareness of the 
painting. Thus aesthetic judgment is not either a self-reflection or an observation of 
something external to the mind: it is, rather, an expression of a feeling of the life of the mind 
in response to a beautiful object. 
 
5. Feeling as mediating reveals both the possibility and the limitation of cognition 
I have argued that feeling affords an exhibition of the subjective conditions of cognition as a 
reflection on their difference as well as their commonality. I have also shown how such an 
exhibition does not aim at the unity necessary for cognition. I will now argue that the 
exhibition afforded by feeling offers an insight into the possibility of cognition, while 
simultaneously revealing its limitation. Only feeling can achieve this on account of its 
peculiar status as a unique sensation that is undeterminable and yet is the ground for non-
conceptually determining judgments. I conclude that feeling is neither wholly active nor 
merely receptive. 
As we have seen, reflective feeling compares the subjective conditions of cognition, 
yet precludes the determination of an intuition under a concept required for cognition. I think 
it is helpful to consider this as the distinction between possible and actual cognition. In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses these in the first and second postulates, respectively. 
The possible is “whatever agrees [übereinkommt] with the formal conditions of experience 
(in accordance with intuition and concepts).” The actual is “that which is bound up with 
[zusammenhängt]29 the material conditions of experience (of sensation)” (A218/B265-66, 
translation modified). How might this illuminate what Kant calls “cognition in general”? 
There are three main references to this notion in Section 9: (i) in mere judging the 
presentational powers “relate a given presentation to cognition in general” (CJ 5:217, 
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translation modified), (ii) “the mental state in this presentation must be that of a feeling of the 
free play of the powers of presentation in a given presentation for a cognition in general” (CJ 
5:217, translation modified), and (iii) in free play the faculties “agree with each other as is 
requisite for a cognition in general” (CJ 5:218). While the first of these may only claim that 
free play and “cognition in general” are compatible, the others make clear that free play 
entails “cognition in general.” As it is evident that free play cannot be cognitive, “cognition 
in general” cannot be equivalent to cognition. I propose that “cognition in general” is the 
subjective formal condition of experience, with which any cognition must agree. The first 
postulate states the formal conditions of experience are intuitions and concepts. The 
subjective grounds of their possibility exhibited in aesthetic judgments are the faculties of 
imagination (for the combination of the manifold in intuition [CJ 5:240]) and understanding 
(for the unification of the manifold under concepts). Thus, “cognition in general” is the 
relation between these subjective formal conditions of experience with which any possible 
cognition must agree and which are exhibited or expressed in free play, that is, reflective 
feeling. “Cognition in general” – as the ground of mere judging – is, thus, the ultimate ground 
and the vindication of the distinctive status of aesthetic judgments. Meanwhile, “cognition in 
general” cannot be – just because it is free and not determined under a concept – “bound up 
with” the determination of a material sensation under a concept. “Cognition in general” is a 
necessary condition of the possibility of cognition, but cannot give rise to any actual 
cognition. 
Claiming that “cognition in general” exhibits the subjective cooperation of the 
faculties necessary for the possibility of any cognition thus does not imply that aesthetic 
judgments are subordinated to the general project of cognition. Aesthetic judgments do not 
simply fail to become actual cognitions: they are incompatible with actual cognition. The 
subjective conditions of cognition operating in default of determination under a concept 
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amount to an alternative form of awareness, which although not, in principle, opposed to 
cognition is, in fact, incompatible with it. This is because aesthetic judgments are based on 
feeling, the unique “so-called sensation” that cannot be determined under a concept. Feeling 
is a form of reflective awareness that resists cognitive resolution. The unique so-called 
sensation thus exhibits the mere possibility of cognition only because it is undeterminable, 
that is, only because it cannot become an actual cognition. Distinctively aesthetic judgments 
with feeling as their ground serve as a demonstration that not every form of consciousness is 
cognitive, nor is oriented toward determination under a concept. Feeling and cognition 
coexist within a plurality of orientations that are, in principle, compatible with and yet 
irreducible to one another. It is thus not the case that aesthetic judgments belong to the 
general project of determining objects under concepts.
30
 
In resisting cognitive resolution, feeling operates as a distinctive form of awareness 
that is distinct from cognition and emotion (CJ 5:226). Feeling can only serve as a 
simultaneous reflection on the possibility and the limitations of cognition insofar as this form 
of awareness has something in common with, while being distinct from, cognition. Feeling is 
neither wholly spontaneous like understanding, nor is it merely receptive like intuition. 
Feeling is, nonetheless, allied to spontaneity insofar as it operates through mere reflection 
and, at the same time, allied to sensibility in that through feeling we are receptive to beautiful 
objects. Feeling allows the mind to feel its own state – the relation between spontaneity and 
sensibility – only because it is neither entirely active nor merely receptive. 
For Allison, feeling is active. His initial account of feeling is that it both appraises and 
discriminates. We appraise “the capacity of a representation to occasion an enhancement or 
diminution of one’s cognitive faculties in their cooperative activity.”
31
 Discrimination, on the 
other hand, operates “in the reception or acceptance of representations conducive to free play 
and the rejection of those that are not.”
32
 Feeling is thus not merely receptive – in Allison’s 
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terms, not merely discriminatory – which leads him to conclude that feeling is an “active 
faculty.”
33
 
While Allison’s characterization of feeling as more than merely receptive is 
suggestive, I do not conclude that feeling is active rather than receptive. Instead, feeling has 
the peculiar intermediary status of combining the activity of mere reflection with receptivity 
to an object. If feeling were an active faculty, as Allison claims, it would be incapable of 
carrying out the role of mediating between receptivity (imagination as the capacity to 
combine what is given) and spontaneity (understanding as the capacity to unify under a 
concept). Instead, it would ultimately act in the interests of spontaneity, that is, 
understanding’s capacity to determine under a concept so as to give rise to cognition.
34
 If, on 
the other hand, feeling were merely receptive, it would not qualify as a “unique so-called 
sensation” and would, like all other sensations, be determinable under a concept (FI 20:224). 
A merely receptive feeling would also be incapable of serving as the ground of the non-
cognitive determination of objects as beautiful in aesthetic judgments (CJ 5:219). Only a 
form of consciousness that is neither entirely active nor merely receptive is capable of 
relating our spontaneous and receptive capacities, that is, of comparing them in their free play 
with one another. In doing so, feeling as the unique so-called sensation that is neither a 
concept nor a mere sensation is an alternative form of reflection, operating at the limits of 
sensibility and understanding.
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